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Abstract
In resource buying games a set of players jointly buys a subset of a finite resource set
E (e.g., machines, edges, or nodes in a digraph). The cost of a resource e depends on the
number (or load) of players using e, and has to be paid completely by the players before it
becomes available. Each player i needs at least one set of a predefined family Si ⊆ 2E to
be available. Thus, resource buying games can be seen as a variant of congestion games
in which the load-dependent costs of the resources can be shared arbitrarily among the
players. A strategy of player i in resource buying games is a tuple consisting of one of i’s
desired configurations Si ∈ Si together with a payment vector pi ∈ RE+ indicating how
much i is willing to contribute towards the purchase of the chosen resources. In this paper,
we study the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria (PNE, for
short) of resource buying games. In contrast to classical congestion games for which
equilibria are guaranteed to exist, the existence of equilibria in resource buying games
strongly depends on the underlying structure of the families Si and the behavior of the
cost functions. We show that for marginally non-increasing cost functions, matroids are
exactly the right structure to consider, and that resource buying games with marginally
non-decreasing cost functions always admit a PNE.
1 Introduction
We introduce and study resource buying games as a means to model selfish behavior of players
jointly designing a resource infrastructure. In a resource buying game, we are given a finite
set N of players and a finite set of resources E. We do not specify the type of the resources,
they can be just anything (e.g., edges or nodes in a digraph, processors, trucks, etc.). In our
model, the players jointly buy a subset of the resources. Each player i ∈ N has a predefined
family of subsets (called configurations) Si ⊆ 2
E from which player i needs at least one set
Si ∈ Si to be available. For example, the families Si could be the collection of all paths linking
two player-specific terminal-nodes si, ti in a digraph G = (V,E), or Si could stand for the set
of machines on which i can process her job on. The cost ce of a resource e ∈ E depends on the
number of players using e, and needs to be paid completely by the players before it becomes
available. As usual, we assume that the cost functions ce are non-decreasing and normalized
in the sense that ce never decreases with increasing load, and that ce is zero if none of the
players is using e. In a weighted variant of resource buying games, each player has a specific
weight (demand) di, and the cost ce depends on the sum of demands of players using e. In
resource buying games, a strategy of player i can be regarded as a tuple (Si, pi) consisting of
one of i’s desired sets Si ∈ Si, together with a payment vector pi ∈ R
E
+ indicating how much
i is willing to contribute towards the purchase of the resources. The goal of each player is
to pay as little as possible by ensuring that the bought resources contain at least one of her
desired configurations. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE, for short) is a strategy profile
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{(Si, pi)}i∈N such that none of the players has an incentive to switch her strategy given that
the remaining players stick to the chosen strategy. A formal definition of the model will be
given in Section 2.
Previous Work.
As the first seminal paper in the area of resource buying games, Anshelevich et al. [5] in-
troduced connection games to model selfish behavior of players jointly designing a network
infrastructure. In their model, one is given an undirected graph G = (V,E) with non-negative
(fixed) edge costs ce, e ∈ E, and the players jointly design the network infrastructure by buy-
ing a subgraph H ⊆ G. An edge e of E is bought if the payments of the players for this
edge cover the cost ce, and, a subgraph H is bought if every e ∈ H is bought. Each player
i ∈ N has a specified source node si ∈ V and terminal node ti ∈ V that she wants to be
connected in the bought subgraph. A strategy of a player is a payment vector indicating
how much she contributes towards the purchase of each edge in E. Anshelevich et al. show
that these games have a PNE if all players connect to a common source. They also show
that general connection games might fail to have a PNE (see also Section 1 below). Several
follow-up papers (cf. [3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12]) study the existence and efficiency of pure Nash and
strong equilibria in connection games and extensions of them. In contrast to these works, our
model is more general as we assume load-dependent congestion costs and weighted players.
Load-dependent cost functions play an important role in many real-world applications as, in
contrast to fixed cost functions, they take into account the intrinsic coupling between the
quality or cost of the resources and the resulting demand for it. A prominent example of
this coupling arises in the design of telecommunication networks, where the installation cost
depends on the installed bandwidth which in turn should match the demand for it.
Hoefer [13] studied resource buying games for load-dependent non-increasing marginal
cost functions generalizing fixed costs. He considers unweighted congestion games modeling
cover and facility location problems. Among other results regarding approximate PNEs and
the price of anarchy/stability, he gives a polynomial time algorithm computing a PNE for
the special case, where every player wants to cover a single element.
First Insights.
Before we describe our results and main ideas in detail, we give two examples motivating our
research agenda.
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Fig. 1 (b)
Consider the scheduling game illustrated in Fig.1(a) with two resources (machines) {e, f}
and three players {1, 2, 3} each having unit-sized jobs. Any job fits on any machine, and the
processing cost of machines e, f is given by cj(ℓj(S)), where ℓj(S) denotes the number of jobs
on machine j ∈ {e, f} under schedule S. In our model, each player chooses a strategy which
is a tuple consisting of one of the two machines, together with a payment vector indicating
how much she is willing to pay for each of the machines. Now, suppose the cost functions
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for the two machines are ce(0) = cf (0) = 0, ce(1) = cf (1) = 1, ce(2) = cf (2) = 1 and
ce(3) = cf (3) = M for some large M > 0. One can easily verify that there is no PNE: If
two players share the cost of one machine, then a player with positive payments deviates to
the other machine. By the choice of M , the case that all players share a single machine can
never be a PNE. In light of this quite basic example, we have to restrict the set of feasible
cost functions. Although the cost functions ce and cf of the machines in this scheduling game
are monotonically non-decreasing, their marginal cost function is neither non-increasing, nor
non-decreasing, where we call cost function ce : N → R+ marginally non-increasing [non-
decreasing] if
ce(x+ δ)− ce(x) ≥ [≤] ce(y + δ)− ce(y) ∀x ≤ y; x, y, δ ∈ N. (1)
Note that cost functions with non-increasing marginal costs model economies of scale and
include fixed costs as a special case. Now suppose that marginal cost functions are non-
increasing and consider scheduling games on restricted machines with uniform jobs. It is not
hard to establish a simple polynomial time algorithm to compute a PNE for this setting: Sort
the machines with respect to the costs evaluated at load one. Iteratively, let the player whose
minimal cost among her available resources is maximal exclusively pay for that resource, drop
this player from the list and update the cost on the bought resource with respect to a unit
increment of load.
While the above algorithm might give hope for obtaining a more general existence and
computability result for PNEs for non-increasing marginal cost functions, we recall a counter-
example given by [5]. Consider the connection game illustrated in Fig.1(b), where there are
two players that want to establish an si-ti path for i = 1, 2. Any strategy profile (state) of
the game contains two paths, one for each player, that have exactly one edge e in common.
In a PNE, no player would ever pay a positive amount for an edge that is not on her chosen
path. Now, a player paying a positive amount for e (and at least one such player exists)
would have an incentive to switch strategies as she could use the edge that is exclusively used
(and paid) by the other player for free. Note that this example uses fixed costs which are
marginally non-increasing.
Our Results and Outline.
We study unweighted and weighted resource buying games and investigate the existence and
computability of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PNEs, for short). In light of the examples
illustrated in Fig.1, we find that equilibrium existence is strongly related to two key properties
of the game: the monotonicity of the marginal cost functions and the combinatorial structure
of the allowed strategy spaces of the players.
We first consider non-increasing marginal cost functions and investigate the combinato-
rial structure of the strategy spaces of the players for which PNEs exist. As our main result
we show that matroids are exactly the right structure to consider in this setting: In Sec-
tion 3, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a PNE for unweighted matroid
resource buying games. This algorithm can be regarded as a far reaching, but highly non-
trivial extension of the simple algorithm for scheduling games described before: starting with
the collection of matroids, our algorithm iteratively makes use of deletion and contraction
operations to minor the matroids, until a basis together with a suitable payment vector for
each of the players is found. The algorithm works not only for fixed costs, but also for the
more general marginally non-increasing cost functions. Matroids have a rich combinatorial
structure and include, for instance, the setting where each player wants to build a spanning
tree in a graph. In Section 4, we study weighted resource buying games. We prove that for
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non-increasing marginal costs and matroid structure, every (socially) optimal configuration
profile can be obtained as a PNE. The proof relies on a complete characterization of config-
uration profiles that can appear as a PNE. We lose, however, polynomial running time as
computing an optimal configuration profile is NP-hard even for simple matroid games with
uniform players. In Section 5, we show that our existence result is ”tight” by proving that
the matroid property is also the maximal property of the configurations of the players that
leads to the existence of a PNE: For every two-player weighted resource buying game having
non-matroid set systems, we construct an isomorphic game that does not admit a PNE.
We finally turn in Section 6 to resource buying games having non-decreasing marginal
costs. We show that every such game possesses a PNE regardless of the strategy space.
We prove this result by showing that an optimal configuration profile can be obtained as a
PNE. We further show that one can compute a PNE efficiently whenever one can compute
a best response efficiently. Thus, PNE can be efficiently computed even in multi-commodity
network games.
Connection to Classical Congestion Games.
We briefly discuss connections and differences between resource buying games and classical
congestion games. Recall the congestion game model: the strategy space of each player
i ∈ N consists of a family Si ⊆ 2
E of a finite set of resources E. The cost ce of each
resource e ∈ E depends on the number of players using e. In a classical congestion game,
each player i chooses one set Si ∈ Si and needs to pay the average cost of every resource in
Si. Rosenthal [14] proved that congestion games always have a PNE. This stands in sharp
contrast to resource buying games for which PNE need not exist even for unweighted singleton
two-player games with non-decreasing costs, see Fig.1(a). For congestion games with weighted
players, Ackermann et al. [1] showed that for non-decreasing marginal cost functions matroids
are the maximal combinatorial structure of strategy spaces admitting PNE. In contrast,
Theorem 6.1 shows that resource buying games with non-decreasing marginal cost functions
always have a PNE regardless of the strategy space. Our characterization of matroids as
the maximal combinatorial structure admitting PNE for resource buying games with non-
increasing marginal costs is also different to the one of Ackermann et al. [1] for classical
weighted matroid congestion games with non-decreasing marginal costs. Ackermann et al.
prove the existence of PNE by using a potential function approach. Our existence result relies
on a complete characterization of PNE implying that there exist payments so that the optimal
profile becomes a PNE. For unweighted matroid congestion games, Ackermann et al. [2] prove
polynomial convergence of best-response by using a (non-trivial) potential function argument.
Our algorithm and its proof of correctness are completely different relying on matroid minors
and cuts.
These structural differences between the two models become even more obvious in light
of the computational complexity of computing a PNE. In classical network congestion games
with non-decreasing marginal costs it is PLS-hard to compute a PNE [2, 10] even for un-
weighted players. For network games with weighted players and non-decreasing marginal
costs, Dunkel and Schulz [8] showed that it is NP-complete to decide whether a PNE exists.
In resource buying (network) games with non-decreasing marginal costs one can compute a
PNE in polynomial time even with weighted players (Theorem 6.2).
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2 Preliminaries
The Model. A tuple M = (N,E,S, (di)i∈N , (cr)r∈E) is called a congestion model, where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, E = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of resources, and S = ×i∈NSi
is a set of states (also called configuration profiles). For each player i ∈ N , the set Si is a
non-empty set of subsets Si ⊆ E, called the configurations of i. If di = 1 for all i ∈ N we
obtain an unweighted game, otherwise, we have a weighted game. We call a configuration
profile S ∈ S (socially) optimal if its total cost c(S) =
∑
e∈E ce(S) is minimal among all
S ∈ S.
Given a state S ∈ S, we define ℓe(S) =
∑
i∈N :e∈Si
di as the total load of e in S. Every
resource e ∈ E has a cost function ce : S → N defined as ce(S) = ce(ℓe(S)). In this
paper, all cost functions are non-negative, non-decreasing and normalized in the sense that
ce(0) = 0. We now obtain a weighted resource buying game as the (infinite) strategic game
G = (N,S × P, π), where P = ×i∈NPi with Pi = R
|E|
+ is the set of feasible payments for
the players. Intuitively, each player chooses a configuration Si ∈ Si and a payment vector
pi for the resources. We say that a resource e ∈ E is bought under strategy profile (S, p), if∑
i∈N p
e
i ≥ ce(ℓe(S)), where p
e
i denotes the payment of player i for resource e. Similarly, we
say that a subset T ⊆ E is bought if every e ∈ T is bought. The private cost function of each
player i ∈ N is defined as πi(S) =
∑
e∈E p
e
i if Si is bought, and πi(S) = ∞, otherwise. We
are interested in the existence of pure Nash equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles that are resilient
against unilateral deviations. Formally, a strategy profile (S, p) is a pure Nash equilibrium,
PNE for short, if πi(S, p) ≤ πi((S
′
i, S−i), (p
′
i, p−i)) for all players i ∈ N and all strategies
(Si, pi) ∈ Si ×Pi. Note that for PNE, we may assume w.l.o.g that a pure strategy (Si, pi) of
player i satisfies pei ≥ 0 for all e ∈ Si and p
e
i = 0, else.
Matroid Games. We call a weighted resource buying game a matroid (resource buying)
game if each configuration set Si ⊆ 2
Ei with Ei ⊆ E forms the base set of some matroid
Mi = (Ei,Si). As it is usual in matroid theory, we will throughout write Bi instead of Si,
and B instead of S, when considering matroid games. Recall that a non-empty anti-chain1
Bi ⊆ 2
Ei is the base set of a matroid Mi = (Ei,Bi) on resource (ground) set Ei if and only
if the following basis exchange property is satisfied: whenever X,Y ∈ Bi and x ∈ X \Y , then
there exists some y ∈ Y \X such that X \ {x} ∪ {y} ∈ Bi. For more about matroid theory,
the reader is referred to [15].
3 An Algorithm for Unweighted Matroid Games
Let M = (N,E,B, (ce)e∈E) be a model of an unweighted matroid resource buying game.
Thus, B = ×i∈NBi where each Bi is the base set of some matroid Mi = (Ei,Bi), and
E =
⋃
i∈N Ei. In this section, we assume that the cost functions ce, e ∈ E are marginally
non-increasing.
Given a matroid Mi = (Ei,Bi), we denote by Ii = {I ⊆ E | I ⊆ B for some B ∈ Bi} the
collection of independent sets inMi. Furthermore, we call a set C ⊆ Ei a cut of matroid Mi
if Ei\C does not contain a basis ofMi. Let Ci(Mi) denote the collection of all inclusion-wise
minimal cuts of Mi. We will need the following basic insight at several places.
Lemma 3.1. [15, Chapters 39 – 42] Let M be a weighted matroid with weight function
w : E → R+. A basis B is a minimum weight basis of M if and only if there exists no basis
B∗ with |B \B∗| = 1 and w(B∗) < w(B).
1Recall that Bi ⊆ 2
Ei is an anti-chain (w.r.t. (2Ei ,⊆)) if B,B′ ∈ Bi, B ⊆ B
′ implies B = B′.
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In a strategy profile (B, p) of our game with B = (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ B (and n = |N |) players
will jointly buy a subset of resources B¯ ⊆ E with B¯ = B1 ∪ . . . ∪Bn. Such a strategy profile
(B, p) is a PNE if none of the players i ∈ N would need to pay less by switching to some
other basis B′i ∈ Bi, given that all other players j 6= i stick to their chosen strategy (Bj , pj).
By Lemma 3.1, it suffices to consider bases Bˆi ∈ Bi with Bˆi = Bi− g+ f for some g ∈ Bi \ Bˆi
and f ∈ Bˆi \ Bi. Note that by switching from Bi to Bˆi, player i would need to pay the
additional marginal cost cf (lf (B) + 1) − cf (lf (B)), but would not need to pay for element
g. Thus, (B, p) is a PNE iff for all i ∈ N and all Bˆi ∈ Bi with Bˆi = Bi − g + f for some
g ∈ Bi \ Bˆi and f ∈ Bˆi \Bi holds p
g
i ≤ cf (lf (B) + 1)− cf (lf (B)).
We now give a polynomial time algorithm (see Algorithm 1 below) computing a PNE for
unweighted matroid games with marginally non-increasing costs. The idea of the algorithm
can roughly be described as follows: In each iteration, for each player i ∈ N , the algorithm
maintains some independent set Bi ∈ Ii, starting with Bi = ∅, as well as some payment
vector pi ∈ R
E
+, starting with the all-zero vector. It also maintains a current matroid M
′
i =
(E′i,B
′
i) that is obtained from the original matroidMi = (Ei,Bi) by deletion and contraction
operations (see e.g., [15] for the definition of deletion and contraction in matroids.) The
algorithm also keeps track of the current marginal cost c′e = ce(ℓe(B)+1)−ce(ℓe(B)) for each
element e ∈ E and the current sequence B = (B1, . . . , Bn). Note that c
′
e denotes the amount
that needs to be paid if some additional player i selects e into its set Bi. In each iteration,
while there exists at least one player i such that Bi is not already a basis, the algorithm
chooses among all cuts in C = {C ∈ Ci(M
′
i) | for some i ∈ N} an inclusion-wise minimal cut
C∗ whose bottleneck element (i.e., the element of minimal current weight in C∗) has maximal
c′-weight (step 3). (We assume that some fixed total order (E,) is given to break ties, so
that the choices of C∗ and e∗ are unique.) It then selects the bottleneck element e∗ ∈ C∗
(step 4), and some player i∗ with C∗ ∈ Ci(M
′
i) (step 5). In an update step, the algorithm lets
player i∗ pay the marginal cost c′e∗ (step 7), adds e
∗ to Bi∗ (step 8), and contracts element e
∗
in matroid M′i∗ (step 12). If Bi∗ is a basis in the original matroid Mi∗ , the algorithm drops
i∗ from the player set N (step 10). Finally, the algorithm deletes the elements in C∗ \ {e∗}
in all matroids M′i for i ∈ N (step 16), and iterates until N = ∅, i.e., until a basis has been
found for all players.
Obviously, the algorithm terminates after at most |N | · |E| iterations, since in each itera-
tion, at least one element e∗ is dropped from the ground set of one of the players. Note that
the inclusion-wise minimal cut C∗ whose bottleneck element e∗ has maximal weight (step 3),
as well as the corresponding player i∗ and the bottleneck element e∗, can be efficiently found,
see the appendix for a corresponding subroutine.
It is not hard to see that Algorithm 1 corresponds exactly to the procedure described in
Section 1 to solve the scheduling game (i.e., the matroid game on uniform matroids) with
non-increasing marginal cost functions. We show that the algorithm returns a pure Nash
equilibrium also for general matroids. As a key Lemma, we show that the current weight of
the chosen bottleneck element monotonically decreases.
Theorem 3.1. The output (B, p) of the algorithm is a PNE.
Proof. Obviously, at termination, each set Bi is a basis of matroid Mi, as otherwise, player
i would not have been dropped from N , in contradiction to the stopping criterium N = ∅.
Thus, we first need to convince ourselves that the algorithm terminates, i.e., constructs a
basis Bi for each matroid Mi. However, this follows by the definition of contraction and
deletion in matroids:
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Algorithm 1 Computing PNE in Matroids
Input: (N,E,Mi = (Ei,Bi), c)
Output: PNE (B, p)
1: Initialize B′i = Bi, E
′
i = Ei, Bi = ∅, p
e
i = 0, te = 1, and c
′
e = ce(1) for each i ∈ N and
each e ∈ E;
2: while N 6= ∅ do
3: choose C∗ ← argmax{min{c′e : e ∈ C} | C ∈ C inclusion-wise minimal}
where C = {C ∈ Ci(M
′
i) | for some player i ∈ N};
4: choose e∗ ← argmin{c′e | e ∈ C
∗};
5: choose i∗ with C∗ ∈ Ci∗(M
′
i∗);
6: pe
∗
i∗ ← c
′
e∗ ;
7: c′e∗ ← ce∗(te∗ + 1)− ce∗(te∗);
8: Bi∗ ← Bi∗ + e
∗;
9: if Bi∗ ∈ Bi∗ then
10: N ← N − i∗;
11: end if
12: B′i∗ ← B
′
i∗/e
∗ = {B ⊆ E′i∗ \ {e
∗} | B + e∗ ∈ B′i∗};
13: E′i∗ ← E
′
i∗ \ {e
∗};
14: te∗ ← te∗ + 1;
15: for all players i ∈ N do
16: B′i ← B
′
i \ (C
∗ \ {e∗}) = {B ⊆ E′i \ (C
∗ \ {e∗}) | B ∈ B′i}
17: E′i ← E
′
i \ (C
∗ \ {e∗});
18: end for
19: end while
20: B = (B1, . . . , Bn), p = (p1, . . . , pn);
21: Return (B, p)
To see this, we denote by N (k) the current player set, and by B
(k)
i andM
(k)
i = (E
(k)
i ,B
(k)
i )
the current independent set and matroid of player i at the beginning of iteration k. Suppose
that the algorithm now chooses e∗ in step 4 and player i∗ in step 5. Thus, it updates
B
(k+1)
i∗ ← B
(k)
i∗ + e
∗ in step 8 and considers the base set B
(k)
i∗ /e
∗ of the contracted matroid
M
(k)
i∗ /e
∗. Note that for each B ∈ B
(k)
i∗ /e
∗, the set B+ e∗ is a basis in B
(k)
i∗ , and, by induction,
B +B
(k+1)
i∗ is a basis in the original matroid Mi∗ . Thus, B
(k+1)
i∗ is a basis in Mi∗ (and i
∗ is
dropped from N (k)) if and only if B
(k)
i∗ /e
∗ = {∅}.
Now consider any other player i 6= i∗ with B
(k)
i 6= {∅} (and thus i ∈ N
(k)). Then, for the
new base set B
(k+1)
i = B
(k)
i \ (C
∗ \ {e∗}) we still have B
(k+1)
i 6= {∅}, since otherwise C
∗ \ {e∗}
is a cut in matroidM
(k)
i , in contradiction to the choice of C
∗. Thus, since the algorithm only
terminates when N (k) = ∅ for the current iteration k, it terminates with a basis Bi for each
player i.
Note that throughout the algorithm it is guaranteed that the current payment vectors
p = (p1, . . . , pn) satisfy
∑
i∈N p
e
i = ce(ℓe(B)) for each e ∈ E and the current independent sets
B = (B1, . . . , Bn). This follows, since the payments are only modified in step 7, where the
marginal payment pe
∗
i∗ = ce∗(ℓe∗(B) + 1)− ce∗(ℓe∗(B)) is assigned just before e
∗ was selected
into the set Bi∗ . Since we assumed the ce’s to be non-decreasing, this also guarantees that
each component pei is non-negative, and positive only if e ∈ Bi.
It remains to show that the final output (B, p) is a PNE. Suppose, for the sake of contra-
diction, that this were not true, i.e., that there exists some i ∈ N and some basis Bˆi ∈ Bi with
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Bˆi = Bi−g+f for some g ∈ Bi \ Bˆi and f ∈ Bˆi \Bi such that p
g
i > cf (lf (B+1))−cf (lf (B)).
Let k be the iteration in which the algorithm selects the element g to be paid by player
i, i.e., the algorithm updates B
(k+1)
i ← B
(k)
i + g. Let C
∗ = C(k) be the cut for matroid
M
(k)
i = (E
(k)
i ,B
(k)
i ) chosen in this iteration. Thus, the set E
(k)
i \ C
∗ contains no basis in
B
(k)
i , i.e., no set B ⊆ E
(k)
i \ C
∗ with B + B
(k)
i ∈ Bi. Note that the final set Bi contains no
element from C∗ other than g, as all elements in C∗ \ {g} are deleted from matroid M
(k)
i /g.
We distinguish the two cases where f ∈ C∗, and where f 6∈ C∗.
In the first case, if f ∈ C∗, then, since the algorithm chooses g of minimal current marginal
weight, we know that pgi = cg(lg(B
(k) + 1) − cg(lg(B
(k))) ≤ cf (lf (B
(k) + 1) − cf (lf (B
(k))).
Thus, the marginal cost of f must decrease at some later point in time, i.e., cf (lf (B + 1))−
cf (lf (B)) < cf (lf (B
(k) + 1) − cf (lf (B
(k))). But this cannot happen, since f is deleted from
all matroids for which the algorithm has not found a basis up to iteration k.
However, also the latter case cannot be true: Suppose f 6∈ C∗. If f ∈ E
(k)
i , then Bˆi\B
(k)
i ⊆
E
(k)
i \C
∗, but Bˆi = Bˆi \B
(k)
i +B
(k)
i ∈ Bi, in contradiction to C
∗ being a cut in M
(k)
i . Thus,
f must have been dropped from Ei in some iteration l prior to k by either some deletion
or contraction operation. We show that this is impossible (which finishes the proof): A
contraction operation of type M
(l)
i → M
(l)
i /el drops only the contracted element el from
player i’s ground set E
(l)
i , after el has been added to the current set B
(l)
i ⊆ Bi. Thus, since
f 6∈ Bi, f must have been dropped by the deletion operation in iteration l. Let C(l) be
the chosen cut in iteration l, and el the bottleneck element. Thus, f ∈ C(l) − el. Now,
consider again the cut C∗ = C(k) of player i which was chosen in iteration k. Recall that the
bottleneck element of C(k) in iteration k was g. Note that there exists some cut C ′ ⊇ C(k)
such that C ′ is a cut of player i in iteration l and C(k) was obtained from C ′ by the deletion
and contraction operations in between iterations l and k. Why did the algorithm choose
C(l) instead of C ′? The only possible answer is, that the bottleneck element a of C ′ has
current weight c
(l)
a ≤ c
(l)
el ≤ c
(l)
f . On the other hand, if f was dropped in iteration l, then
c
(l)
f = cf (lf (B + 1)) − cf (lf (B)). Thus, by our assumption, c
(l)
f < p
g
i = c
(k)
g . However, since
the cost function cg is the marginally non-increasing, it follows that c
(k)
g ≤ c
(l)
g . Summarizing,
we yield c
(l)
a ≤ c
(l)
el ≤ c
(l)
f < c
(k)
g ≤ c
(l)
g , and, in particular, c
(l)
el < c
(k)
g , in contradiction to
Lemma 3.2 below (proven in the appendix).
Lemma 3.2. Let cˆk denote the current weight of the bottleneck element chosen in step 4
of iteration k. Then this weight monotonically decreases, i.e., l < k implies cˆl ≥ cˆk for all
l, k ∈ N.
4 Weighted Matroid Games
For proving the existence of PNE in weighted matroid games with non-increasing marginal
costs our algorithm presented before does not work anymore. We prove, however, that there
exists a PNE in matroid games with non-increasing marginal costs even for weighted demands.
To obtain our existence result, we now derive a complete characterization of configuration
profiles B ∈ B in weighted matroid games (N,E,B, d, c) that can be obtained as a PNE.
For our characterization, we need a few definitions: For B ∈ B, e ∈ E and i ∈ Ne(B) :=
{i ∈ N | e ∈ Bi} let ex
e
i := {f ∈ E − e | Bi − e + f ∈ Bi} ⊆ E denote the set of all
resources f such that player i could exchange the resources e and f to obtain an alternative
basis Bi − e + f ∈ Bi. Note that exi(e) might be empty, and that, if exi(e) is empty,
the element e lies in every basis of player i (by the matroid basis exchange property). Let
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F := {e ∈ E | e lies in each basis of i for some i ∈ N} denote the set of elements that are
“fixed” in the sense that they must lie in one of the players’ chosen basis. Furthermore, we
define for all e ∈ E − F and all i ∈ Ne(B) and all f ∈ exi(e) the value ∆i(B; e → f) :=
cf (ℓf (Bi + f − e,B−i)) − cf (ℓf (B)) which is the marginal amount that needs to be paid in
order to buy resource f if i switches from Bi to Bi− e+ f . Finally, let ∆
e
i (B) be the minimal
value among all ∆i(B; e → f) with f ∈ exi(e). The proof of the following characterization
can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a weighted matroid resource buying game (N,E,B, d, c). There is
a payment vector p such that the strategy profile (B, p) with B ∈ B is a PNE if and only if
ce(B) ≤
∑
i∈Ne(B)
∆ei (B) for all e ∈ E \ F. (2)
Note that the above characterization holds for arbitrary non-negative and non-decreasing
cost functions. In particular, if property (2) were true, it follows from the constructive
proof that the payment vector p can be efficiently computed. The following Theorem 4.2
states that matroid games with non-increasing marginal costs and weighted demands always
possess a PNE. We prove Theorem 4.2 (in the appendix) by showing that any socially optimal
configuration B ∈ B satisfies (2).
Theorem 4.2. Every weighted matroid resource buying game with marginally non-increasing
cost functions possesses a PNE.
Note that the above existence result does not imply an efficient algorithm for computing
a PNE: It is straightforward to show that computing a socially optimal configuration profile
is NP-hard even for unit demands and singleton strategies.
5 Non-Matroid Strategy Spaces
In the previous section, we proved that for weighted matroid congestion games with non-
negative, non-decreasing, marginally non-increasing cost functions, there always exists a PNE.
In this section, we show that the matroid property of the configuration sets is also the
maximal property needed to guarantee the existence of a PNE for all weighted resource buying
games with marginally non-increasing costs (assuming that there is no a priori combinatorial
structure how the strategy spaces are interweaved). This result and its proof (in the appendix)
is related to one of Ackermann et al. in [1] for the classical weighted matroid congestion games
with average cost sharing and marginally non-decreasing cost functions.
Theorem 5.1. For every non-matroid anti-chain S on a set of resources E, there exists a
weighted two-player resource buying game G = (E˜, (S1 × S2)× P, π) having marginally non-
increasing cost functions, whose strategy spaces S1 and S2 are both isomorphic to S, so that
G does not possess a PNE.
6 Non-Decreasing Marginal Cost Functions
In this section, we consider non-decreasing marginal cost functions on weighted resource
buying games in general, i.e., S = ×i∈NSi is not necessarily the cartesian product of matroid
base sets anymore. We prove that for every socially optimal state S∗ in a congestion model
with non-decreasing marginal costs, we can define marginal cost payments p∗ that result in
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a PNE. Formally, for a given socially optimal configuration profile S∗ ∈ S and a fixed order
σ = 1, . . . , n of the players, we let Ne(S
∗) := {i ∈ N | e ∈ S∗i } denote the players using e
in S∗, N je (S∗) := {i ∈ Ne(S
∗) | i ≤σ j} denote the players in Ne(S
∗) prior or equal to j
in σ, and ℓ
≤j
e (S∗) =
∑
i∈Nje (S∗)
di denote the load of these players on e in S
∗. Given these
definitions, we allocate the cost ce(ℓe(S
∗)) for each resource e ∈ E among the players in
Ne(S
∗) by setting pei = 0 if e 6∈ S
∗
i and p
i
e = ce(ℓ
≤j
e (S∗))− ce(ℓ
≤j−1
e (S∗)) if player i is the j-th
player in Ne(S
∗) w.r.t. σ. Let us call this payment vector marginal cost pricing.
Theorem 6.1. Let S∗ be a socially optimal solution. Then, marginal cost pricing induces a
PNE. (The proof is in the appendix.)
We now show that there is a simple polynomial time algorithm computing a PNE whenever
we are able to efficiently compute a best-response. By simply inserting the players one after
the other using their current best-response with respect to the previously inserted players,
we obtain a PNE. It follows that for (multi-commodity) network games we can compute a
PNE in polynomial time.
Theorem 6.2. For multi-commodity network games with non-decreasing marginal costs,
there is a polynomial time algorithm computing a PNE.
The proof is straight-forward: Because payments of previously inserted players do not
change in later iterations and marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, the costs of al-
ternative strategies only increase as more players are inserted. Thus, the resulting strategy
profile is a PNE.
7 Conclusions and Open Questions
We presented a detailed study on the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash
equilibria in resource buying games. Our results imply that the price of stability is al-
ways one for both, games with non-decreasing marginal costs and games with non-increasing
marginal costs and matroid structure. Regarding the price of anarchy, even on games with
matroid structure it makes a difference whether cost functions are marginally non-increasing
or marginally non-decreasing. For non-increasing marginal costs it is known that the price of
anarchy is n (the lower bound even holds for singleton games). On the other hand, for non-
decreasing marginal costs we can show that the price of anarchy for uniform and partition
matroids is exactly n, while it is unbounded for graphical matroids even on instances with
only two players. Convergence of best-response dynamics has not been addressed so far and
deserves further research.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 A Subroutine to Detect C∗, e∗ and i∗
We might assume that the elements of E′ = E′1 ∪ . . . ∪ E
′
n = {e1, . . . , em} are listed by non-
increasing current c′-weights and such that the tie-breaking rule induced by the total order
(E,) is respected. (Note that in each iteration, only the c′-weight of the chosen bottleneck
element might change to some smaller weight. The c′-weight of the remaining elements keeps
the same.) The following procedure is used to detect an inclusion-wise minimal cut C∗ of
some player i∗ with the property that the bottleneck element e∗ of C∗ has maximal c′-weight
among all possible cuts in this game: Initially, set C∗ = {em} and k = m. If C
∗ is a cut
(i.e., if E′ − C∗ does not contain a basis) for at least some player, set e∗ = ek and decrease
C∗ to some inclusion-wise minimal cut as follows: as long as possible, choose some element
e ∈ C∗ − e∗ such that C∗ − e remains a cut for at least one of the players i∗ ∈ N , and set
C∗ ← C∗ − e; Return (C∗, e∗, i∗); Else, update C∗ ← C∗ + ek−1, and iterate with k ← k − 1.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. For each iteration k let c
(k)
e denote the current weight of element e, and C
(k)
i denote
the current set of inclusion-wise minimal cuts for player i. Note that for each cut C ∈ C
(k)
i
with k > 1, there exists some C ′ ∈ C
(k−1)
i such that C ⊆ C
′ and C is obtained from C ′ by the
contraction and deletion operations of iteration k− 1. For the sake of contradiction, suppose
that k is the first iteration such that cˆk > cˆk−1. Let e be the bottleneck element chosen
in step 4 of iteration k − 1. Thus, the corresponding cut C(k) that was chosen in step 3 of
iteration k must be obtained from some larger cut C ′ by removing at least one element a ∈ C ′
with c
(k−1)
a ≤ cˆk−1 = c
(k−1)
e , and, if equality, with a ≺ e. Since the deletion operation of
iteration k − 1 removes only elements e′ ∈ E of weight c
(k−1)
e′ ≥ c
(k−1)
e , and if equality, those
with e′ ≻ e, the element a must have been dropped from C ′ by contracting e, i.e., a = e.
Since this contraction operation touches only the matroid of the player chosen in iteration
k − 1, say i, it suffices to consider only the cut sets C
(k)
i and C
(k−1)
i and the base sets B
(k)
i
and B
(k−1)
i of player i in iterations k and k − 1. So far, we observed that a ∈ C
′ ∩ C(k − 1)
where C ′ and C(k − 1) are both cuts in C
(k−1)
i , and that the element a vanishes from cut C
′
by the contraction operation M
(k−1)
i →M
(k−1)
i /a. Thus, C
′ − a must be a (not necessarily
inclusion-wise minimal) cut inM
(k−1)
i /a. However, since C
′ is an inclusion-wise minimal cut
in M
(k−1)
i , the set E
(k−1)
i − (C
′ − a) contains some basis Bˆ ∈ B
(k−1)
i with a ∈ Bˆ. Thus,
B := Bˆ− a is a set in E
(k−1)
i − (C
′− a) with B+ a ∈ B
(k−1)
i , in contradiction to C
′− a being
a cut in M
(k−1)
i /a.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We first proof the ”only if” direction. Let (B, p) be a PNE. Then, by Lemma 3.1 and
the definition of a PNE, we obtain for all e ∈ E \ F :
ce(B) =
∑
i∈Ne(B)
pei ≤
∑
i∈Ne(B)
∆ei (B).
Note that the ∆ei (B) are well defined as we only consider elements in E \ F . Now we prove
the ”if” direction. For all e ∈ F we pick a player i with exi(e) = ∅ and let her pay the entire
cost, i.e., pei = ce(B). For all e ∈ E \ F and i ∈ Ne(B), we define
pei =
∆ei (B)∑
j∈Ne(B)
∆ej(B)
· ce(B),
if the denominator is positive, and pei = 0, otherwise. Using (2), we obtain
pei ≤ ∆
e
i (B) for all e ∈ E \ F
proving that (B, p) is a PNE.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We prove that any socially optimal configuration profile B ∈ B satisfies (2) and,
thus, by Theorem 4.1 there exists a payment vector p such that (B, p) is a PNE. Assume by
contradiction that B does not satisfy (2). Hence, there is an e ∈ E \ F with
ce(B) >
∑
i∈Ne(B)
∆ei (B). (3)
12
By relabeling indices we may write Ne(B) = {1, . . . k} for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and define for
every i ∈ Ne(B) the tuple (Bˆi, fi) ∈ Bi× (Ei− e) as the one minimizing ∆i(B; e→ f) among
all tuples (B′i, f) ∈ Bi× (Ei− e) with B
′
i = Bi+ f − e ∈ Bi. Note that (Bˆi, fi) is well defined
as e ∈ E \ F . We now iteratively change the current basis of every player in Ne(B) in the
order of their indices to the alternative basis Bˆi, i = 1, . . . k. This gives a sequence of profiles
(B0, B1, . . . Bk) with B0 = B and Bi = (Bˆi, B
i−1
−i ) for i = 1, . . . k. For the cost increase of
the new elements fi, i ∈ Ne(B), we obtain the key inequality cfi(ℓfi(B
i−1)) − cfi(ℓfi(B
i)) ≤
∆ei (B). This inequality holds because cost functions are marginally non-increasing, that is,
the marginal costs only decrease with higher load. Plugging everything together, yields
c(B)− c(Bk) =
k∑
i=1
(c(Bi−1)− c(Bi)) =
k∑
i=1
(ce(ℓe(B
i−1)) + cfi(ℓfi(B
i−1))
− ce(ℓe(B
i))− cfi(B
i))
= ce(ℓe(B))− ce(ℓe(B
k)) +
k∑
i=1
(cfi(ℓfi(B
i−1))− cfi(B
i))
≥ ce(ℓe(B))−
k∑
i=1
∆ei (B) > 0,
where the first inequality uses ce(ℓe(B
k)) = ce(0) = 0 (note that e ∈ E\F ) and the assumption
that cost functions have non-increasing marginal costs. The second strict inequality follows
from (3). Altogether, we obtain a contradiction to the optimality of B.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Recall that S ⊆ 2E is an anti-chain (with respect to (2E ,⊆)) if for every X ∈ S, no proper
superset Y ⊂ X belongs to S. Also note that it suffices to consider configuration sets Si that
form an anti-chain, as (due to the non-negative cost functions) player i would never have an
incentive to switch her strategy to a superset of her chosen one.
We call S a non-matroid set system if the tuple (E, {X ⊆ S : S ∈ S}) is not a matroid.
The following Lemma can also be derived from the proof of Lemma 16 in [1].
Lemma A.1. If S ⊆ 2E is a non-matroid antichain, then there exist X,Y ∈ S and {a, b, c} ⊆
X ∪ Y such that each set Z ⊆ (X ∪ Y )− a contains both, b and c.
Proof. Recall the basis exchange property for matroids: an anti-chain B ⊆ 2E is the family
of bases of some matroid if and only if for any X,Y ∈ B and x ∈ X \ Y there exists some
y ∈ Y \X such that X − x+ y ∈ B. Thus, if the anti-chain S ⊆ 2E is a non-matroid, there
must exist X,Y ∈ S and x ∈ X \ Y such that for all y ∈ Y \X the set X − x+ y does not
belong to S. We choose such X,Y and x ∈ X \ Y with |Y \X| minimal (among all Y ′ ∈ S
with X − x + y′ 6∈ S for all y′ ∈ Y ′ \ X). We distinguish the two cases |Y \ X| = 1 and
|Y \ X| ≥ 1: In case |Y \ X| = 1, set {a} = Y \ X and choose any two distinct elements
{b, c} ∈ X \ Y . Note that |X \ Y | ≥ 2 as otherwise, if X \ Y = {x}, then Y = X − x+ a, in
contradiction to our assumption. Now, for any set Z ⊆ (X ∪ Y )− a, the anti-chain property
implies Z = X, and therefore {b, c} ⊆ Z, as desired.
In the latter case |Y \X| ≥ 1, we choose any two distinct elements {b, c} ∈ Y \X and set
a = x. Consider any Z ∈ S with Z ⊆ (X ∪Y )− a and suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
that {b, c} 6⊆ Z. Since Z \X ⊆ Y \X, there cannot exist some z ∈ Z \X with X−a+ z ∈ S.
However, |Z \X| < |Y \X| in contradiction to our choice of Y .
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Proof of the Theorem. Let S1 ⊆ 2
E1 and S2 ⊆ 2
E2 be the two strategy spaces for player one
and player two, respectively, both isomorphic to our given non-matroid anti-chain S ⊆ 2E .
In the following, we describe the game G by defining the demands and costs and describing
how the resources and strategy spaces interweave: For each player i = 1, 2, choose Xi, Yi ∈ Si
and {ai, bi, ci} ⊆ Ei as described in Lemma A.1. In our game G, the two players have only
three resources in common, i.e., {x, y, z} = E1 ∩ E2. We set x := a1 = b2, y := a2 = b1 and
z := c1 = c2. All other resources in Ei \ {x, y, z} are exclusively used by player i for i = 1, 2.
We define the (load-dependent) costs ce(t) , t ∈ R+ for the resources e ∈ E˜ = E1 ∪ E2 as
follows: all elements in (X1 ∪X2 ∪ Y1 ∪ Y2) \ {x, y, z} have a cost of zero, and all elements
in E1 \ (X1 ∪ Y1) and in E2 \ (X2 ∪ Y2) have some very large cost M . The costs on {x, y, z}
are defined as cx(t) = t, cy(t) = 5
1
2 and cz(t) = 4. Note that each of these cost functions is
non-negative, non-decreasing and marginally non-increasing .
Now, suppose that (Z∗, p∗) with Z∗ = (Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 ) ∈ S1 × S2 and p
∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2) ∈ R
E1
+ × R
E2
+
were a PNE for the game as described above with demands d1 = 5 and d2 = 4. Choosing M
large enough ensures that Z∗i ⊆ Xi ∪ Yi for each player i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, by the choice
of Xi and Yi in the proof of Lemma A.1, there exist S1, T1 ∈ S1 with x ∈ S1, {y, z} ∩ S1 = ∅
and x 6∈ T1 ⊇ {y, z}, as well as S2, T2 ∈ S2 with y ∈ S2, {x, z} ∩ S2 = ∅ and y 6∈ T2 ⊇ {x, z}.
By Lemma A.1, it follows from Z∗i ⊆ Xi ∪ Yi that
x 6∈ Z∗1 =⇒ {y, z} ⊆ Z
∗
1 and y 6∈ Z
∗
2 =⇒ {x, z} ⊆ Z
∗
2 . (4)
We now show that neither x ∈ Z∗1 , nor x 6∈ Z
∗
1 can be true. This would be the desired
contradiction to our assumption that the game possesses a PNE.
For each player i ∈ {1, 2}, and each configuration Si ∈ Si, let c
∗
i (Si) denote the price that
player i would have to pay so that the resources in Si are bought, given that the other player
j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} sticks to her strategy (Z∗j , p
∗
j ). Consider the case x 6∈ Z
∗
1 : By (4), it follows
that {y, z} ⊆ Z∗1 . Thus, since Z
∗
1 ⊆ X1 ∪ Y1, the only resources in Z
∗
1 of non-zero cost are y
and z, i.e., p∗1(Z
∗
1 ) = p
∗
1(y) + p
∗
1(z) ≤ c
∗
1(S1) = d1 = 5. Note that y 6∈ Z
∗
2 is not possible, as
otherwise player 1 would need to pay c∗1(y) = 5
1
2 to buy resource y which is more than the
price of d1 = 5 needed to buy S1. Thus, y ∈ Z
∗
2 must be true. It follows that p
∗
2(z) = 0, as
otherwise p∗2(Z
∗
2 ) ≥ p
∗
2(y) + p
∗
2(z) > p
∗
2(y) = c
∗
2(S2). Thus, since z ∈ Z
∗
1 , player 1 has to pay
p∗2(z) = 4 in order to buy resource z. Since p
∗
1(Z
∗
1 ) ≤ c
∗
1(S1) = 5, it follows that p
∗
1(y) ≤ 1,
and therefore, since y ∈ Z∗2 , p
∗
2(y) ≥ 4
1
2 . However, in this case player 2 could use resource z
for free and therefore switch to strategy T2 for which she would only need to pay the price
for resource x which is d2 = 4. So, x 6∈ Z
∗
1 is not possible in a PNE.
It remains to consider case x ∈ Z∗1 : Then p
∗
1(Z
∗
1 ) = p
∗
1(x)+p
∗
1(y)+p
∗
1(z) ≥ p
∗
1(x) = c
∗
1(S1)
implies p∗1(y) = p
∗
1(z) = 0. Therefore y 6∈ Z
∗
2 , since otherwise, p
∗
2(y) = 5
1
2 , so that player 1
could use resource y for free and therefore switch to strategy T1 ∈ S1 of cost 4 = cz. However,
if y 6∈ Z∗2 , then {x, z} ⊆ Z
∗
2 by equation (4). Hence, p
∗
2(z) = 4 (since p
∗
1(z) = 0). It follows
that p∗2(x) ≤ 1
1
2 , since otherwise, player 2 would switch to strategy S2 ∈ S2 and pay only the
price of 512 for resource y. Thus, p
∗
1(x) ≥ 7
1
2 which is strictly greater than the price of 5
1
2
which player 1 would need to pay if she switches to strategy T1. Hence, also x ∈ Z∗1 is not
possible in a PNE, which finishes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be the payment vector obtained by marginal cost pricing. Sup-
pose there is a player that unilaterally improves by deviating to some (S′i, p
′
i). Thus, S
′ =
(S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
i−1, S
′
i, S
∗
i+1, . . . , Sn), and p
′
i differs from pi only on elements in S
′
i∆S
∗
i = S
′
i \ S
∗
i ∪
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S∗i \ S
′
i, while p
′
j = pj for all other players i 6= j ∈ N . For the payoff difference, we therefore
calculate that
πi(S
′, p′)− πi(S
∗, p) =
∑
r∈S′i\S
∗
i
(
cr(ℓr(S
∗) + di)− cr(ℓr(S
∗))
)
−
∑
r∈S∗i \S
′
i
pri < 0.
Because costs are marginally non-decreasing, we obtain pri ≤ cr(ℓr(S
∗))−cr(ℓr(S
∗)−di) for all r ∈
S∗i . Using this inequality we obtain
c(S′)− c(S∗) =
∑
r∈S′
i
\S∗
i
(
cr(ℓr(S
∗) + di)− cr(ℓr(S
∗))
)
−
∑
r∈S∗
i
\S′
i
(
cr(ℓr(S
∗))− cr(ℓr(S
∗)− di)
)
≤
∑
r∈S′i\S
∗
i
(
cr(ℓr(S
∗) + di)− cr(ℓr(S
∗))
)
−
∑
r∈S∗i \S
′
i
pri
< 0,
a contradiction to S∗ being optimal.
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